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Abstract: Taking as its starting point the mental earthquake produced by the 2011 uprisings, 
this article tackles the epistemological questions of causality and contingency in an effort to 
foster dialogue between comparative political regime studies, the sociology of revolutions 
and social movement literature. Based on a comparative analysis of three ‘positive cases’ 
(Egypt, Syria and Tunisia), and a ‘negative case’ (Morocco), it follows an interactionist and 
sequential approach to revolutionary situations. Its main objective is to expand the scope of 
the attempts aimed at reconciling structure and contingency, by focusing on the formation of 
large coalitions and the spread of mobilization on division or defection from within the 
repressive apparatus, and on the impact of crisis management by the incumbents. More 
specifically, the article highlights the fact that uncertainty affects not only the ‘actors from 
below,’ but all the actors present: the challengers as much as the incumbents and their 
international allies, the ordinary citizens as well as the officers and the recruits. 
Keywords: Arab uprisings; Army; Causality; Coalition formation; Contingency; Crisis 
management; Defection; Egypt; Morocco; Repressive apparatus; Revolutions; Syria; 
Tunisia.   
Reflecting on Iran’s 1979 revolution, Edmund Burke observed that a revolution ‘sweeps’ 
away not only a regime, but also a view of the world.1 In the early 1990s, to grasp the extent 
of the surprise engendered by the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the American 
Sociological Association organized two symposia.2 The wave of uprisings of 2011 also led to 
a mental earthquake, and scholars wondered, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab 
Spring.’3 A fundamental epistemological question, that of causality, underlies such debates. 
For some scholars, revolutions are like ‘traffic jams’: They have some causes, which can be 
unraveled in retrospect.4 The difficulty of constructing models and making predictions is 
connected to the complexity and multiplicity of these causes, as well as to their inextricable 
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1 E. Burke III (1988) Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections, in: E. Burke III & I. Lapidus 
(eds) Islam, Politics, and Social Movements (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), p. 
17. 
2 The proceedings of the first conference are published in: Theory and Society, 23(2), 1993; proceedings of the 
second are in: American Journal of Sociology, 100(6), 1995. 
3 F. Gregory Gause III (2011) Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian 
Stability, Foreign Affairs, 90(4), pp. 81–90. 
4 See, e.g., Charles Tilly (1995) European Revolutions: 1492-1992 (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishing).  
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nature. According to other scholars, revolutions are ‘inevitably’ a surprise,5 since they belong 
to a class of ‘contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable’ events.6 
Despite the initial surprise, the 2011 uprisings and their results often were analyzed—
after the fact—as developments stemming logically from more or less distant determinants, 
and consequently as ‘inevitable.’7 In contrast, I argue in this article that an interactionist and 
sequential approach is propitious for reconciling structure and contingency, and, even more, 
for expanding the scope of this reconciliation. Indeed, I aim to apprehend the processes 
underpinning these events on the basis of ‘what actors are, do and say in situ’ by 
examining—sequence by sequence—the connections between the macro level of the 
environment, the meso level of relations among collective actors, and the micro level of 
individuals.8 In so doing, this article can contribute to fostering dialogue among comparative 
political regime studies, the sociology of revolutions, and social movement literature.9 More 
specifically, I tackle the following enigma: Confronted with the same wave of protests, the 
Moroccan regime displayed resilience, unlike the governments in Tunisia, Egypt, or Syria, 
where popular mobilization developed into a ‘revolutionary situation,’ that is to say, a 
situation in which the state’s sovereignty is subject to multiple, competing claims supported 
by a significant portion of the population, and where the power holders cannot, or do not 
wish to, crush the oppositional coalition.10 Subsequently, in the medium term, these 
revolutionary situations led to different developments: a democratic transition in Tunisia, a 
counterrevolution in Egypt, and a civil war in Syria.  In such diversified cases as those of 
Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Morocco— and beyond the alleged ontological opposition between 
republics and monarchies11— what can we attribute to structural determinants and what 
                                               
5 Timur Kuran (1995) The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises, American Journal of Sociology, pp. 
1528–1551. 
6 William H. Sewell, Jr. (1996) Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology, in: T. J. McDonald (ed.) 
The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, 98 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press), p. 264; 
also see Charles Kurzman (2004) The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge and Harvard: Harvard 
University Press). 
7 For a critical review, see, e.g., Morten Valbjørn (2015) Reflections on Self-Reflections: –On Framing the 
Analytical Implications of the Arab Uprisings for the Study of Arab Politics, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 218–
238. 
8 Following in the footsteps of Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi & Olivier Fillieule (2012) Towards a Sociology of 
Revolutionary Situations: Reflections on the Arab Uprisings, Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 
62(5-6), pp. 1–29.  
9 In the same vein, see, e.g., Amin Allal & Thomas Pierret (eds) (2013) Au cœur des révoltes arabes [Inside the 
Arab revolts] (Paris: Colin); Joel Beinin & Frédéric Vairel (eds) (2013) Social Movements, Mobilization, and 
Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press); Michel Camau & 
Frédéric Vairel (eds) (2014) Soulèvements et recompositions politiques dans le Monde Arabe [Political 
uprisings and recompositions in the Arab world] [(Montréal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal); Raymond 
Hinnebusch (2015) Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes, Democratization, 
22(2), pp. 358–374. For the use of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas to understand these processes through their 
historicity, see, e.g., John Chalcraft (2016) Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
10 Charles Tilly (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley), pp. 189-222. 
11 For a discussion about monarchical exceptionalism and for a critical view of institutionalist explanations see, 
e.g., Daniel Bischof & Simon Fink (2015) Repression as a Double-Edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs, 
Repression and Revolution in the Arab World, Swiss Political Science Review, 21(3), pp. 377–395. 
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might we deduce as effects of contingency?  
In the first section of this article, I question the structuralist bias explicit in the 
nomothetic models of political change and implicit in the analysis, leaving room for 
contingency solely at the level of mobilization (i.e., the actors ‘from below’). Following this, I 
present the interactionist and sequential approach. Secondly, I explore to what extent some of 
the processes observed in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Morocco in 2011 tend to transcend the 
conditions of their genesis,12 focusing on two main properties of the revolutionary situations: 
the spread of mobilization and the formation of large coalitions; and division or defection from 
within the repressive apparatus. Finally, I emphasize the fact that the way an authoritarian 
regime manages a crisis cannot simply be reduced to political preconditions; and, so doing, I 
highlight the fact that ‘time matters.’13  In the process, acknowledging the extent of ‘our 
own ignorance,’14 I shed light on certain gray zones that future historians might explore.  
Beyond the Opposition between Structure and Contingency 
The persistent structuralist bias  
The 2011 uprisings triggered a frenetic wave of academic activity, and calls from all directions 
to ‘renew,’ ‘revisit,’ and ‘reframe’ debates. 15  On this occasion, attempts at de-
compartmentalizing and invitations to ‘capture the dynamism of the uprisings and their 
effects’16 were proposed. However, the urge to grasp the contingency effects of these events 
has been expressed mostly through a greater attention to mobilizations or micro events. When 
it comes to analyzing the internal variations of the ‘Arab Spring,’ the structuralist bias tends to 
take the lead. The new impulse of the nomothetic approach can be epitomized by a 1994 
research program launched at US government’s request with the goal of producing tools to 
measure and predict sociopolitical instability. In this context, an ambitious quantitative study 
of the ‘Arab Spring’ was published.17 According to the statistical regression analyses produced, 
the factors which most greatly reduced destabilization during the 2011 uprisings were: first, 
‘political preconditions’ (type of political order, presence or absence of intra-elite conflict, and 
power transfer tools); secondly, an ‘immunity’ to internal conflicts that derived from having 
                                               
12 Roderick Aya (1990) Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis). 
13 Andrew Abbott (2001) Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
 
14 Leyla Dakhli (2013) Tunisia and Syria: Comparing Two Years of Revolution, Middle East Critique, 22(3), p. 
300.  
15 See, for example, Michelle Pace & Francesco Cavatorta (2012) The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical 
Perspective – An Introduction, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), pp. 125-138. See also the following special 
issues: The Arab Uprisings of  2011, Middle East Critique (2013), 22(3); From Arab Spring to Arab Winter: 
Explaining the limits of post-uprising democratisation, Democratization (2015), 22(2); Révolutions arabes: un 
événement pour les sciences sociales ? [Arab revolutions: An event for the social sciences?], Revue des Mondes 
Musulmans et de la Méditerranée [Review of the Muslim worlds and of the Mediterranean] (2015), 138. 
16 Steven Heydemann (2015) Explaining the Arab Uprisings: Transformations in Comparative Perspective, 
Mediterranean Politics, pp. 1–13.  
17 Andrey V.  Korotayev, Leonid M. Issaev, Sergey Y. Malkov & Alisa P. Shishkina (2014) The Arab Spring: A 
Quantitative Analysis, Arab Studies Quarterly, 36(2), pp. 149–169. 
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experienced large-scale conflict in the recent past and the participation of Islamist groups in 
official political life; and thirdly, ‘the level of internal contradictions’ (related to religious and 
ethnic heterogeneity and to the unequal redistribution of power and economic resources). 
Certainly, this literature provides a wealth of insights. Nonetheless, it suffers from three major 
weaknesses, already raised by some sociologists of revolutions. First, this kind of retrospective 
and teleological never-ending quest focuses on distant or remote ‘causes’ of the emergence of 
mobilization, and increasingly use popular methods of providing evidence: regression statistics 
that identify ‘pure’ effects of one variable on another ‘all things being equal,’ or combinations 
of variables. Even though these analyses come closer to the realities observed, they still capture 
only what happened before the event. Second, the ambition to develop explanatory models 
tends to be reductionist and to obfuscate the fact that ‘social causality is temporally 
heterogeneous.’18 The third weakness is related to the difficulty of linking the micro level of 
individuals with the macro level, resulting in actors remaining in the background, when they 
are not portrayed as iconic figures, or subsumed under reifying categories.19  
Even when there is an attempt to learn ‘lessons from the Arab Spring,’ the ‘agency,’ 
the ‘contingency,’ and the potential of ‘surprise’ too often are limited to the mobilization or 
to the actors ‘from below.’ For example, in light of the 2011 uprisings, Eva Bellin suggested 
analyzing ‘the complementary roles of structure, agency, intention, and contingency in 
complex political phenomena such as political uprisings.’20 However, she concluded that 
‘little’ was ‘surprising from a theoretical point of view,’ except the social mobilization 
observed.21 This tendency to confine agency and contingency to mobilization prevails even 
among the scholars of social movements who have been dealing with the issue over a period 
of time. As Philip Balsiger pointed out, ‘the dominant conceptualization of social movement 
activity resembles a tennis player firing balls against a wall. The tennis player is the social 
movement […]. His opponent, meanwhile, is pictured as a wall: exhibiting certain structural 
characteristics.’22  In the following sections, I suggest developing an interactionist and 
sequential approach that considers all the actors present as players, carrying the print of a 
historicity, but also subject to emotion, uncertainty, and experimentation by trial and error.23  
Toward an interactionist and sequential approach 
The interactionist and sequential approach advocated in this article is keeping with the 
ambitious project of Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, which aimed to 
                                               
18 Sewell, Three Temporalities, p. 263. 
19 Roderick Aya (2001) The third man; or, agency in history; or, rationality in revolution, History and Theory, 
40(4), pp. 143-152. 
20 Eva Bellin (2012) Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the 
Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2), p. 127. 
21 Ibid, p. 135. 
22 Phillip Balsiger (2015) Corporations as Players and Arenas, in: M. J. Jasper & J. W. Duyvendak (eds) Players 
and Arenas (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) p. 119. 
23 Following in the footsteps of Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, 
see, e.g., Jasper & Duyvendak, (eds) Players and Arenas.  
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restructure the political process model around the study of mechanisms specific to different 
kinds of episodes.24 However, I sketch out propositions, based on borrowings from other 
traditions, in order to make their model: 1) more interactive and sequential; 2) more open to 
the effects of contingency; and 3) more open to emotions.  According to the authors in 
Dynamics of Contention, the main challenge for students of contentious politics is to 
‘identify crucial causal mechanisms that recur in a wide variety of contention, but produce 
different aggregate outcomes depending on the initial conditions, combinations, and 
sequences in which they occur.’25 Therefore, they argue in favor of a ‘reorientation of 
explanations from episodes to mechanisms and processes.’26 Recognizing that early models 
‘downplay the contingency, emotionality, plasticity, and interactive character of movement 
politics,’27 they propose a restructuration of the political process model in order to make it 
‘dynamic’ and ‘interactive.’ In this article, I use some of their main concepts. As a reminder, 
the mechanisms are environmental, cognitive, relational, and recognizable when ‘we see 
interactions among the elements in question altering the established connections among 
them’; they form a continuum with the processes, which are ‘recurring causal chains, 
sequences, and combinations of mechanisms.’28 In line with this, a sequence of action is a 
series of performances, underpinned by a set of mechanisms and processes. And 
performances are the cumulative whole of interactions between all the actors participating in 
a conflict; they are shaped by a history of protest, protestors’ and police officers’ cultures, 
and know-how acquired from past battles.29 However, the participants also reinterpret them, 
and sometimes subvert or abandon them entirely, as a result of dynamics that are determined 
on the ground.  
Notwithstanding the ambitious goal pursued in Dynamics of Contention, much 
remains to be done before reaching its objectives in terms of ‘dynamism’ and ‘interactivity.’ 
Similarly, we should note with the authors that ‘contingency dogs [their] analytical path.’30 
Finally, emotions cannot be reduced to the mechanism of ‘attribution of threat and 
opportunity.’ To go further toward a ‘dynamic’ and ‘interactive’ approach, some scholars have 
argued for basing the analysis of the processes underpinning contention episodes, ‘on what 
actors are, do and say in situ,’ by taking into account ‘all the actors present in the space of a 
given conflict.’31 They also recommended examining, through a multilevel analysis, how 
                                               
24 D. McAdam, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (2001) Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
25 Ibid, p. 37. 
26 Ibid, p. 308. 
27 Ibid, p. 15. 
28 Ibid, p. 26. 
29 Charles Tilly (2008) Contentious Performances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 4-5.  
30 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p. 311. 
31 Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, p. 13. For an implementation 
of this concept of multi-level analysis and causation inspired by symbolic interactionism, see, e.g., Olivier 
Fillieule (2015) Disengagement from Radical Organizations: A Process and Multilevel Model of Analysis, in: 
B. Klandermans & C. van Stralen (eds) Movements in Times of Democratic Transition, pp. 34–63 (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press). 
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‘each sequence of actions is modified by processes which lead to its results (new states of 
equilibrium), which in turn help to define the environmental, relational and cognitive 
elements that influence the calculations of the following sequence.’32 Along with these 
propositions, I suggest emphasizing the ‘sequential’ character of this interactionist approach, 
in order to highlight, with Andrew Abbott, the fact that ‘time matters;’ in other words, the 
order of sequences produces an effect on ‘the way they turn out.’ 33  
The interactionist and sequential approach I advocate here is extremely compatible 
with Ivan Ermakoff’s ‘positive conception of contingency.’34 Indeed, Ermakoff contends that 
a distinctive ‘class of processes’ is identifiable during ‘open-ended conjunctures.’35 In 
contrast to a ‘conjunctural causation,’ which, according to George Steinmetz, ‘refers to 
situations in which complex events are determined by variable constellations of causal 
factors,’36 Ermakoff pays attention to ‘the indeterminacy of multiple futures coexisting 
synchronically at one point in time.’37 This ‘endogenous’ property is connected to ‘a 
configuration of interdependence,’ which is ‘marked by actors’ mutual recognition of their 
uncertainty,’ and by the absence of a ‘pre-established script.’ From there on, he suggests 
‘tracking down’ these moments of collective indeterminacy.38 Claiming that it is ‘through 
their impact on the agency of particular individuals that incidental causes affect evolving 
action systems and thereby acquire collective significance,’ he distinguishes four types of 
impacts: ‘A pyramidal impact rests on the existence of a hierarchical system of power 
relations. Pivotal is the action that decisively shifts a balance of power. Sequential impact 
describes the alignment of individual stances on observed behavior. The impact is epistemic 
when it affects beliefs that actors presume they are sharing.’39 
In keeping with scholars such as Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, 
one also should go beyond the misleading opposition between ‘emotion’ and ‘rationality’ or 
‘cognition’ and reincorporate the role of emotions during these sequences of actions and 
interactions without confining them to the micro-level of analysis. Indeed, emotions are 
‘collective as well as individual, and they permeate large-scale units of social organization, 
including workplaces, neighborhood and community networks, political parties, movements, 
and states, as well as the interactions of these units with one another.’40 In line with Stéphane 
Latté, it is also important to pay attention to ‘their collective character (a joint production 
rather than an individual creation), established (produced by inherited constraints associated 
                                               
32 Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, p. 14. 
33 Abbott, Time Matters, p. 51. 
34 Ivan Ermakoff (2015) The Structure of Contingency, American Journal of Sociology, 121(1), p. 114. 
35 Ibid. 
36 G. Steinmetz (1998) Critical Realism and Historical Sociology. A Review Article, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 40(1), p. 173 quoted by Ermakoff, The Structure of Contingency, p. 70. 
37 Ermakoff, The Structure of Contingency, p. 110. 
38 Ibid, p. 100. 
39 Ibid, p. 66. 
40 Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper & Francesca A. Polletta (eds) (2001) Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social 
Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 16.  
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with the role, observed and adapted), reflexive (with the actors as aware as the observers of 
the constraints and opportunities of various emotional registers) and relational (the meaning 
and weight of emotional prescriptions varying from one social configuration to another, from 
one context of mobilization to another).’41  
Notwithstanding the divergences between some of these theoretical traditions, I argue 
that an interactionist and sequential approach is particularly propitious to their reconciliation 
and to further exploring how to deal with the ‘messiness’ of causation during open-ended 
conjunctures: ‘Causal mechanisms cumulate, contradict one another, aggregate, and link 
together, unfolding simultaneously on multiple levels.’42 The main challenge is twofold. On 
the first level, we need to focus on what shapes a context of potentiality,43 without, however, 
confusing the ‘origins’ of revolutions with their ‘causes.’44 In order to reduce the structuralist 
bias, we should grasp the contextual dimension, not as a set of determining causes, addressed 
mechanically and from above, but as conducive elements, which refer to the characteristics of 
the environment, the collective actors and the individuals. According to this view, 
environmental and relational elements tend to constrain the way actors express and frame 
their identities, their emotions, and shape the form of their interactions. In return, they are 
perceived and appropriated differently, depending on the actors, their resources, positions, 
dispositions, and interactions, etc. On a second level, an interactionist and sequential 
approach should enable us to pay attention to the indeterminacy of open conjunctures, and at 
the same time ‘to de-essentialize any particular characteristics of players and arenas’45 so as 
to avoid the illusion of the ‘immaculate conception’46 and to clarify the connections between 
the macro level of the environment, the meso level of relations among collective actors, and 
the micro level of individuals. It remains to be emphasized that a sequential multilevel 
analysis of the processes underpinning contentious episodes, based on ‘what actors are, do 
and say in situ,’ allows us also to go beyond the alleged structural oppositions between 
monarchies and republics in the Middle East. Wishing to expand the scope of the 
reconciliation between structure and contingency, I focus on the formation of large coalitions 
and the spread of mobilization in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, then I move on to the 
defection within the repressive apparatus of the first three. Finally, I examine the impact of 
                                               
41 S. Latté (2015) Des « mouvements émotionnels » à la mobilisation des émotions [From “emotional 
movements” to the mobilization of emotions], Terrains/Théories [Fieldworks/Theories], (2). Available at 
http://teth.revues.org/244. 
42 Mark R. Beissinger (2011) Mechanisms of Maidan: The Structure of Contingency in the Making of the 
Orange Revolution, Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), p. 27. 
43 Abbott, Time Matters, p. 51. 
44 Roger Chartier (1991) The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press), p. 169.  
45 Jan W. Duyvendak & Olivier Fillieule (2015) Conclusion: Patterned Fluidity: An Interactionist Perspective as 
a Tool for Exploring Contentious Politics, in: J. Jasper & J. W. Duyvendak (eds) Players and Arenas 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), p. 298. 
46 Leila J. Rupp & Verta Taylor (1987) Survival in the Doldrums (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
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crisis management by the incumbents. 









Time 1… Time 2… Time 3…Time x 
 
Common Properties and Variable Configurations 
The outbreak of protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Morocco reveals some common 
properties, recurrently observed during open-ended conjunctures. However, only the first 
three countries experienced a revolutionary situation. At the macro level, the four countries 
witnessed the spread of mobilizations to different categories of the population to varying 
degrees. According to social movement scholars, this phenomenon is related to fluidity and 
uncertainty, which become prevalent insofar as the usual rules of the game no longer are 
respected. At the same time, a phenomenon of modularity is observed,47 in other words, there 
occurs a simplification in the ways of framing the situation and the unification of forms of 
action within the same national unit, as well as from one country to another. At the micro 
level, as uncertainty grew, the present actors no longer made decisions in the same way as 
they used to, even in Morocco. At the meso level, in the four cases, we observe a more or less 
cross-class coalition formation, i. e., the ‘creation of coordinated action across a major class 
boundary’48—and coalescences—in the meaning of the coming together of actors from 
different social groups without any active coordination. Nonetheless, while defection or 
division destabilized the repressive apparatus in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, this was not the 
case in Morocco.  
Formation of Large Coalitions and the Spread of Mobilization 
Considering the formation of large coalitions and the spread of the mobilization as one of the 
main properties of revolutionary situations, scholars have examined closely the facilitating or 
inhibiting factors behind this phenomenon from two angles in particular, the form of the state 
and the shape of class conflict. However, beyond these factors, we also should take into 
account the processes at work during the events. 
                                               
47 Sidney Tarrow (1993) Modular Collective Action and the Rise of the Social Movement: Why the French 
Revolution Was Not Enough, Politics & Society, 21(1), pp. 69–90. 
48 McAdam & al., Dynamics of Contention, p. 275. 
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The Conducive or Hindering Elements 
A situation is conducive when the state is exclusive and interventionist, and when the 
repression is indiscriminate and reaches a high-level. Moreover, cross-class coalitions are 
facilitated when the challengers are less organized and ideologically polarized.49 Also, the 
high or low ‘level of societal identity cleavages’ (sectarian or ethnic cleavages),50 and the 
manner in which they do or do not overlap with a class conflict, would encourage or hinder 
the formation of a cross-class coalition (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Environment Before the Beginning of Mobilization 
 Tunisia Egypt Syria Morocco 
State Exclusive and interventionist Relatively 
inclusive 















































As a number of studies have shown, the pre-revolutionary regimes in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Syria displayed several common characteristics: They were repressive (although to 
varying degrees); their exercise of power was exclusive; they were interventionist, with very 
limited pluralism in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases; and they adopted neoliberal economic 
policies, calling into question past social pacts and reflecting, among other things, a 
concentration of wealth in the hands of those close to the inner circle of power. 
Consequently, the regimes became the principal targets of grievances. Nonetheless, the forms 
of repression adopted contributed to the variety of forms of coalitions and coalescences 
emerging during the revolutionary process.  
In Tunisia, according to a study based on the Arab Barometer survey, there was a 
‘broader cross-class coalition,’ with an over-representation of those aged 18–24 and having a 
                                               
49 See, e.g., Misagh Parsa (2000) States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
50 Hinnebusch, Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes.  
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‘secondary/technical’ education, but there was little representation of members of ‘civil 
society.’51 However, in Egypt, the composition of participants constituted ‘a relatively 
narrow middle-class,’ with an over-representation of those aged 35–44, and those with higher 
education, and a strong representation of members of ‘civil society.’ According to this 
research, the neoliberal policy of Ben Ali’s regime exacerbated regional and generational 
disparities and was accompanied by the repression of civil society organizations that did not 
collude with the regime, whereas the regime of Mubarak dismantled ‘welfare benefits for the 
middle class,’ while tolerating the development of civil society.52  
The regime of Ben Ali could be characterized as a ‘meticulous organization’ of 
repression.53 At the start of the 1990s, it mainly targeted the Islamic movement, Ennahda, 
with the collusion of an array of actors attached to ‘Tunisian secularism.’ Gradually, the 
regime locked down the entirety of the protest arena. From 2005 on, to overcome their 
weakness, some activists, from the left and from Ennahda, started to coordinate their efforts, 
under the umbrella of the 18th October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms. In the interior of 
the country, associations linked to the regime and the UGTT union, whose central leadership 
seemed to be tied to the regime, were spared.54 However, local union cells were ‘abeyance 
networks’ for various opponents and, at the end of the 2000s, never failed to participate in the 
local protest movements.55 When the mobilization spread, grassroots members pulled the 
union’s leadership into the protest. Similarly, the clientelistic networks of the dominant party 
rapidly dissipated, revealing once again that local elites quickly may turn into counter-elites 
in the course of a protest dynamic.56 Such a spread of the mobilization might have been 
favored by the homogeneity of Tunisian ‘societal identity.’57 
The Egyptian configuration presents certain similarities and some differences. After 
alternating between massive indiscriminate repression and isolated and selective repression, 
the Mubarak regime tolerated the development of a civil society. Workers mobilized 
massively on a number of occasions in the course of the 2000s, but independently from the 
                                               
51 Mark R. Beissinger, Amaney A. Jamal & Kevin Mazur (2015) Explaining Divergent Revolutionary 
Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, 
Comparative Politics, 48(1), pp. 1–24.  
52 Ibid, p. 19.  
53 Choukri Hmed (2015) Répression d’État et situation révolutionnaire en Tunisie (2010-2011) [State repression 
and revolutionary situation in Tunisia (2010-2011)], Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire [Twentieth Century: 
History Review], 128(4), p. 80. 
54 Jamie Allinson (2015) Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and 
Syria, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 294–314. 
55 Choukri Hmed (2012) Abeyance Networks, Contingency and Structures. History and Origins of the Tunisian 
Revolution, Revue Française de Science Politique (English), 62(5-6), pp. 797–820. 
 
56 Amin Allal (2012) ‘Revolutionary’ Trajectories in Tunisia: Processes of Political Radicalization 2007-2011, 
Revue Française de Science Politique (English), 62(5-6), pp. 821–841. 
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state-controlled unions.58 Regarding the Muslim Brothers, being tolerated under Mubarak 
allowed them to accumulate organizational resources and electoral experiences,59 thus 
making them the most powerful organized actor (besides the army) after the fall of Mubarak. 
In addition, a number of coalitions were formed (Kifaya, the April 6th Movement, and the 
National Coalition for Change). Moreover, ‘new forms have been shaped by the rise of 
protest movements as an arena for coalition-building and dynamic processes of networking, 
involving different political factions and ideological programs.’60 To some extent, during the 
eighteen days of the Egyptian Revolution a coalescence of these different networks was 
observed. On another level, as soon as the tide began to turn, there was a cascade of 
resignations within the National Democratic Party (NDP), the dominant party. The internal 
divisions already had widened in the preceding months, in conjunction with the adoption of 
new methods for the selection of electoral candidates, with a view to preparing the succession 
in favor of Gamal Mubarak, and which turned out to be ill-suited to the dynamics of local 
allegiances.61 Finally, in the Egyptian case, the spread of mobilization was not hindered by 
societal identity cleavages, at least during the initial revolutionary sequence.  
The Syrian configuration has been particularly distinctive in the intensity of the 
regime’s repression in recent decades. This had decimated or led to the exile of parts of the 
opposition, while it had driven others underground. This also persuaded a great number of 
people to accommodate to the regime. Therefore, when the revolutionary process began, all 
the actors and organizations likely to mobilize the potential challengers were very weak. This 
situation would have encouraged the forms of coordination based on ‘anonymity’ and/or 
‘strong ties.’62 However, local coordinating committees were also structured on the basis of 
pre-existing groups, formal and informal.63 In the face of the fragmentation of the 
revolutionary movement, the administrative and economic elites of the Syrian regime 
experienced few defections. Their loyalty would be partially due to an interpenetration of 
                                               
58 Marie Duboc & Joel Beinin (2013) A Workers’ Social Movement on the Margin of the Global Neoliberal 
Order, Egypt 2004-2012, in: Beinin & Vairel (eds) Social Movements, Mobilization and Contestation in the 
Middle East and North Africa, pp. 205-227. 
59 Marie Vannetzel (2012) La clandestinité ouverte : réseaux et registres de la mobilisation des frères musulmans 
en Égypte (2005-2010) [Openly clandestine: Networks and registers for the mobilization of the Muslim 
Brothers in Egypt], PhD dissertation, Institut d’études politiques de Paris. 
60 Maha Abdelrahman (2011) The Transnational and the Local: Egyptian Activists and Transnational Protest 
Networks, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 38(3), p. 407. 
61 Virginie Collombier (2011) Gamal Moubarak et le Parti National Démocratique ou la stratégie du désastre 
[Gamal Mubarak and the National Democratic Party or the disaster strategy], Outre-Terre [Other World], 29(3), 
p. 343. 
62 Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro & Arthur Quesnay (2013) Mobilisations As a Result of Deliberation and 
Polarising Crisis. The Peaceful Protests in Syria (2011), Revue Française de Science Politique (English), 63(5), 
p. 17.  
63 See, e.g., Matthieu Rey (2013) La révolte des quartiers: territorialisation plutôt que confessionalisation [The 
revolt of the districts: Regional autonomy rather than confessionalism], in: F. Burgat & B. Paoli (eds) Pas de 
printemps pour la Syrie [No spring for Syria] (Paris: La Découverte), p. 90; Reinoud Leenders & Steven 
Heydemann (2012) Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the 
Early Risers, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), pp. 139–159. 
Middle East Critique, volume 26, no. 4 (Fall 2017) 
 12 
interests of the upper classes, who form a ‘military-commercial coalition,’64 and whose 
survival continues to depend on the state’s protection, unlike in Egypt.65   
In comparison with other regimes in the region, the Moroccan monarchy often is 
presented as ‘an expert in survival.’66 For over half a century, it defeated attempts to seize 
power, and defused various revolutionary aspirations.67 On the one hand, after the bloody 
repression of the ‘years of lead’ (1960–1990), recourse to repression became isolated and 
selective, and social movements and demonstrations became routinized. On the other hand, a 
regular renewal of the clientelistic networks and the formation of dense and fragmented 
political, associational and union arenas allowed the regime to divide the challengers, and 
persuade many of them to accept partial rewards in exchange for their more or less collusive 
transactions with the regime. Consequently, grievances tended to be diluted. However, 
protests took place on February 20, 2011, in more than 50 locations. Indeed, the February 
20th Movement spread rapidly, leading to the emergence of an a priori improbable coming 
together, blurring the usual political and social barriers.68 Without precedent, regarding a 
national policy issue, the Movement brought together new players, civil society actors, 
members of governing parties and the parliamentary opposition, as well as activists from 
illegal organizations (from those laying claim to Islamism to different trends of Marxism). 
Indeed, beyond the conducive or hindering elements, some processes tend to transcend the 
conditions of their genesis. 
The Intertwining of Mechanisms Favoring the Spread of Mobilization  
At the meso level, different mechanisms intertwine in a way that fosters widespread 
extension of mobilization. Through relational and ‘non-relational’69 mediations, linkages are 
established between connected or unconnected social sites, and two cognitive mechanisms, in 
particular, encourage the spread of mobilization and the phenomenon of modularity. The first 
is the ‘attribution of similarity.’70 Facilitated by common institutional or cultural 
characteristics or those perceived as such, this mechanism still remains underpinned by the 
work of unifying perceptions, framing strategic identities, and the temporary obfuscation of 
misalignments in terms of the method or objectives. The second is emulation: the statement 
                                               
64 Elizabeth Picard (2008) Armée et sécurité au cœur de l’autoritarisme [Army and security at the heart of 
authoritarianism], in: O. Dabène, V. Geisser, & G. Massardier (eds.) Autoritarismes démocratiques et 
démocraties autoritaires au XXIe siècle [Democratic authoritarianism and authoritarian democracies in the 21st 
century], pp. 303–329 (Paris: La Découverte). 
65 Bassam Haddad (2012) Business Networks in Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 
66 Lisa Anderson (2000) Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive, in: J. Kostiner (ed.) Middle East 
Monarchies. The Challenge of Modernity, pp. 53–69 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
67 Frédéric Vairel (2014) Politique et mouvements sociaux au Maroc [Politics and social movements in 
Morocco] (Paris: Sciences Po Les presses). 
68 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi & Mohamed Jeghllaly (2012) The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th 
Movement, Revue Française de Science Politique (English), 62(5-6), pp. 103–130. 
69 David Strang & John W. Meyer (1993) Institutional Conditions for Diffusion, Theory and Society, 22(4), pp. 
487–511. 
70 Ibid. 
Middle East Critique, volume 26, no. 4 (Fall 2017) 
 13 
‘the impossible became thinkable!’ was reported in several countries, illustrating that the 
success of a performance produces demonstration effects and contributes to precipitating 
action.  
 Seen from Egypt, the rapid fall of Ben Ali, until then considered irremovable, led a 
group of Egyptian actors to recalibrate their perception of the situation, and to seize this 
opportunity to link their own issues to their perceptions of Tunisian events. While those more 
or less close to the Egyptian regime claimed that Egypt was not Tunisia, the challengers 
attempted to bring out the similarities between the two countries.71 Moreover, this episode led 
some brokers ‘quickly and suddenly [to] change their strategic calculations,’ so as to favor 
crucial connections between different networks.72 In Syria, these events also led to the 
transformation of ‘the perceived political opportunities, independently of the evolution of the 
Syrian regime.’73 In Morocco, while supporters of the regime heralded a new version of the 
‘gospel’ of the ‘Moroccan exception,’74 some activists mobilized to defend the idea that 
Moroccans were facing the same injustices as Tunisians, Egyptians, etc. Furthermore, even as 
the Moroccan protest arena was beset by a number of cleavages, the initiators of the 
movement first chose to put aside their differences, emulating what they perceived to be the 
coming together in Tahrir Square during the first stage of the revolution.75  
Along with these relational and cognitive mechanisms, we also should pay attention 
to the ‘emboldening emotions,’76 which range from moral shock to feelings of empowerment. 
In Dara’a, some children were arrested and tortured after having written anti-regime slogans, 
similar to those that they had heard in the media, on the walls of their school.77 On March 13, 
2011, residents took to the streets (although the social base of Dara’a had appeared to be 
close to the regime). Similarly, concerning the collective deliberations among the Syrian 
challengers, Adam Backzo and his co-authors highlighted the ‘circular relationship between 
the constant evaluation of the contexts of action, the emotional intensity, and the definition of 
a collective good.’78 
Finally, we need to emphasize the varying effects the absence of a ‘pre-established 
script’ produced. As noted by Youssef El Chazli, on the 25th of January 2011 in Alexandria, 
                                               
71 Youssef El Chazli (2012) On the Road to Revolution. How Did ‘Depoliticised’ Egyptians Become 
Revolutionaries? Revue Française de Science Politique (English), 5-6 (62), pp. 843–865. 
72 Killian Clarke (2014) Unexpected Brokers of Mobilization: Contingency and Networks in the 2011 Egyptian 
Uprising, Comparative Politics, 46 (4), pp. 379–397. 
73 Baczko, Dorronsoro & Quesnay, Mobilisations As a Result of Deliberation, pp. 6, 13. 
74 E. Burke III (2014) The Ethnographic State (Oakland: University of California Press). 
 
75 M. Bennani-Chraïbi & M. Jeghllaly, The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement; and 
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11(2), p. 387. 
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‘Most of the activists quickly found themselves in a strange dilemma: They hadn’t planned 
for their marches to succeed, so they hadn’t really planned on how the day should end 
accordingly.’79 Besides, the initiators of the movement quickly were overwhelmed by the 
dynamic of the street. In this respect, we should point out that although in Morocco 
uncertainty was far from being absent at the start of the mobilization, unlike in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Syria, political fluidity was rapidly offset by self-restraint that both the authorities and 
the challengers exercised. Therefore, the Moroccan repressive apparatus experienced neither 
divisions nor defections. 
 
Research Perspectives on Challengers’ Coalitions  
To carry out further research on the formation of coalitions from an interactionist and 
sequential perspective, it is necessary to collect sufficient data, from one sequence to another 
and from a multilevel analysis perspective. The aim, here, is to grasp the reconfigurations of 
coalitions, how these transformations affect the form and the scope of their interactions, their 
performances, their targets, and their ‘attribution of opportunities/threats.’80 One of the 
challenges is to disentangle the different kinds of mechanisms underpinning the interactions 
among all the actors present, as well as their various effects. Taking this into consideration, I 
suggest some cautionary remarks. 
First, it is important to identify the different turning points, from a multilevel analysis 
perspective, by cross-checking factual accounts and also by paying attention to the inflections 
of actors’ perceptions. Secondly, we should avoid, if only provisionally, classifying the actors 
too quickly in preconceived categories (for example, ‘Islamists’/’secularists’), and giving too 
much importance to actors perceived as ‘decisive’ due to their position, their level of 
organization, or merely their visibility. Thirdly, it is necessary to remain attentive to the way 
of labeling and to the work of homogenization by a whole series of actors. The (self-)labeling 
of actors also plays a role in the battle between challengers and incumbents, in the internal 
struggles among challengers (to provide the group with an identity and with a demonized 
alterity, to frame emotions, to shape an image, and an aesthetic, etc.). Fourthly, when 
categorizing actors based on the collective identities they put forward, it is important to 
consider the phenomena of splits, mergers, transformation, etc.; and the porosity and the 
circulation among protest arenas, associations and various political sites, official and 
unofficial, clandestine and legal.   
 Finally, at the individual level, we need to examine actors’ environments, the 
transformation of individual values and practices in relation to other dimensions of existence 
                                               
79 Youssef El Chazli (2017) Four Scenes of the Egyptian Revolution in Alexandria: A Microhistory of January 
25. How a Series of Contingencies Walked Us to the Revolution, online at : 
http://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/01/25/feature/politics/four-scenes-of-the-egyptian-revolution-in-alexandria-
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and to the work done by mobilization entrepreneurs; the redefinitions of sociability, 
community links and forms of inter-individual attachment during the revolutionary processes; 
and the phenomena of multi-positioning, reconversion, transformation of the commitment, 
defection, and variation in the intensity and duration of the participation (indeed, of the 
simple identification with an imagined community).81  
Division or Defection From Within the Repressive Apparatus 
The collapse of a state’s repressive capacities constitutes another major characteristic of 
revolutionary situations. During the 2011 uprisings, attention was focused on the armies. 
Much research has established a causal relationship between the characteristics of the 
military institution and the reaction of its officers and recruits faced with mass nonviolent 
mobilization. However, some studies allow us to perceive contingent phenomena.  
Defection and Loyalty: Is There No Room for Surprise? 
According to certain scholars, the degree of homogeneity, institutionalization and 
professionalization of the army shapes loyalty or defection.82 An army is socially 
homogenous or segmented on the basis of primary solidarity (blood ties, ethnicity, 
sectarianism, and tribe). It is institutionalized and professionalized when it functions as a 
specialized sector, governed by its own operating rules, and when promotion is based on 
merit and professional performance. Conversely, it is weakly institutionalized and 
professionalized, when it is strongly imbued with external logic, and when hierarchical 
positions are connected to primary ties of solidarity, political loyalties and economic 
collusion.  
The more homogenous the army, the more institutionalized, professionalized and 
removed from political matters, the less its interests are intrinsically bound up with those of 
the regime, the less it would be disposed to repress nonviolent mass mobilization that is 
sociologically representative of the nation (Table 2). The Tunisian army is presumed to 
represent this archetype. In contrast, the more segmented, less institutionalized and more 
politicized the army, the greater the likelihood that it will experience internal divisions and/or 
defections, in the case of high levels of repression: the army command—whose interests and 
survival are intrinsically bound up with those of the regime—tends to remain loyal to the end, 
while recruits are less inclined to repress protestors who ‘resemble’ them sociologically. The 
Syrian army is alleged to reflect this second model. Halfway between these two 
configurations, the Egyptian army is said to be homogenous, institutionalized and 
                                               
81 Fillieule, Disengagement from Radical Organizations. 
82 See, e.g., Bellin, Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East, p. 143; and Robert 
Springborg (2014) Arab Militaries, in: M. Lynch (ed.) The Arab Uprisings Explained, pp. 142–159 (Columbia: 
Columbia University Press).  
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professionalized, like the Tunisian army; but with aspects in common with the Syrian army in 
terms of its centrality to the construction of the state, and its ‘economic corporatization.’83  
 
Table 2. Factors Facilitating or Inhibiting Defection from or Loyalty to the Army 
 




Post-sequence 1 process 
Tunisia Homogenous, institutionalized, 
professional, ‘apolitical’ 
 
Dissociation from the 
president attacked by 
challengers 
Limited role 
Egypt Homogenous, institutionalized, 
professional, ‘politicized,’ central 
economic actor 
Central role 
Syria Segmented, weakly institutionalized 
and professional, ‘politicized,’ 
economically important actor 
Division Loyal members => harsh 
repression 
Dissidents => Free army  
 
To reinforce loyalty and as coup-proofing strategies, regimes adopt a number of 
measures.84 In a preventative way, they offer economic and political incentives; they 
guarantee their direct control over the army through members of their family, clan, etc., or 
they establish a system of surveillance and ‘counterbalancing strategies’ among different 
structures of the repressive apparatus.85 Nevertheless, during open-ended conjunctures, all is 
not decided in advance. 
Uncertainties Surrounding Defection and Loyalty 
When the mobilization spreads, the incumbents tend to assign the repressive tasks to the units 
that they consider the most loyal, and they apply sanctions. In contrast, those challenging the 
regime resort to tactics designed to encourage the armed forces to rally to their side.86 Once 
more, the ‘absence of pre-established script’ produces different effects of contingency among 
officers and recruits. In this respect, El Chazli reports on an eloquent activist’s account: “An 
officer told me, ‘Tell them to stop!’ and I said, ‘If you can’t control them, I can’t control 
them either.’ They weren’t able to deal with us. They didn’t engage. They just stared at us 
and let us go.”87 Moreover, the information at the disposal of the officers and the recruits 
does not always allow them to make ‘rational calculations.’88  They do not necessarily have a 
clear vision of their own reference group’s positions, the risks they are incurring, the state of 
the power relationships between the political regime and its challengers, or even the future 
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87 El Chazli, Four Scenes of the Egyptian Revolution in Alexandria. 
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attitude of their external allies. Yet, in certain circumstances, officers and recruits are forced 
to decide on the spot, ‘emotionally.’ Thus, it is important to stress that even the army 
command, a posteriori considered homogenous and institutionalized, does not automatically 
choose the side of the ‘people.’  
In the Tunisian case, a whole ‘myth’ was created around General Rachid Ammar, 
who was then Army Chief of Staff. For instance, rumors circulated about his refusal to obey 
orders to fire on the crowd, and the resignation or sidelining of his own superior by Ben Ali; 
rumors that the General denied afterward, but which have played a role in ‘the assurance/de-
assurance games.’89 According to Michel Camau, starting with the protests in Gafsa in 2008 
and Ben Guerdane in 2010, a model of participation of the armed forces in the maintenance 
of order started to take shape, centering around three elements: locking down troubled areas 
and acting as a buffer between the police and the population; non-substitution for the police 
forces; and not opening fire on protestors. In a sense, the general might have been a 
‘consenting victim to the heroization of the military that was merely carrying out its assigned 
role, with only legalism as a guide, without having to experience the dilemma of the exit and 
of loyalty.’90 On the other hand, it was some elite police units, considered as tied to the 
regime, who defected; a process that has yet to be documented.  
As for the Egyptian case, it allows us to glimpse a way of managing mutual 
uncertainty. Starting from the recruitment process, the army proceeds to create a homogenous 
institution, and this homogenization process also takes place throughout officers’ careers, 
with permanent surveillance of their religious and political behavior.91 Despite all of this, 
when widespread mobilization began in 2011, the army command multiplied the number of 
internal surveys to determine to what extent soldiers were inclined to fire on the crowd, and 
make choices likely to maintain the cohesion of the institution.92 Ultimately, homogeneity 
and cohesion are not static and irreversible qualities; they are the result of ongoing efforts and 
can be threatened.  
Research Perspectives on the Repressive Apparatus 
Research on the 2011 uprisings, focusing essentially on the army, too often has viewed the 
repressive apparatus as ‘monolithic.’93 When sources become more available, it will be 
fruitful to retrace meticulously the sequences of action involving the different security 
                                               
89 Michel Camau (2014) Le soulèvement populaire tunisien: retour sur images [Tunisian uprising: Back to the 
images], in: Soulèvements et recompositions politiques dans le monde arabe [Political uprisings and 
recompositions in the Arab world] (Montréal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal), p. 61. 
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apparatuses: Identifying actions, inaction, and interactions within the security apparatuses 
and between the various security apparatuses, with political leaders, protestors, and external 
allies. On another level, it would be useful to specify the context of demonstrations of loyalty 
or defection, at what level and under what circumstances they were produced, the relational, 
cognitive and emotional processes, which underlay them, and the extent of their impact.  
 Loyalty or defection can occur at the individual level, in one part of a security 
apparatus, or in its whole. Loyalty is made manifest in a number of ways and to varying 
degrees: Giving and executing orders in the context of one’s mission, on the basis of routines; 
in respecting the chain of command; taking initiatives from one’s superior position in the 
chain of command or from the bottom rung of the hierarchy; following a limited or lasting 
break in the chain of command and/or operational routines; cooperating with other services; 
cooperating only partially or not cooperating with other services, etc. Moreover, maintaining 
loyalty is a result of various processes which are not mutually exclusive: the identification 
with an emotional community; the absence of a perceived dissonance between the actions to 
be taken, the conception of one’s function, social roots, and moral values; the evaluation of 
costs and benefits for oneself or for one’s reference group; a calculation shaped by a set of 
causal factors, structural and/or situational; and ‘pyramidal alignment,’ based on ‘the 
existence of a hierarchical system of power relations;’94 or ‘sequential alignment,’ after 
observation of the behavior of one’s reference group. 
 Defection is revealed in different ways and to various degrees: not carrying out part of 
one’s orders, without leaving one’s position; remaining in uncertainty and inertia; disobeying 
orders and turning in one’s weapons; ‘fraternizing’; disobeying orders and taking up arms to 
defend those challenging the regime, etc. It is also produced by a number of types of 
processes, not mutually exclusive: interactions with the protestors who attempt to co-opt 
them; ‘moral shocks’ and dissonance between the actions to be taken, the self-conception of 
his or her function, social roots, moral values, etc.; evaluation of the costs and benefits for the 
reference group, or for oneself as an individual;  ‘pyramidal alignment’; ‘epistemological 
alignment,’ reflected in a change of beliefs; ‘sequential alignment,’ in defining oneself as a 
function of one’s choices and the attitudes of one’s reference groups (generational, familial, 
ethnic, sectarian, tribal, professional, or ideological); and alignment on the positions 
perceived as dominant within the institution, after the perception of an internal change in 
power relationships in their favor.  
Crisis Management: Timing (Mal)Adjustment and Cross-Perceptions 
The way an authoritarian regime manages a crisis has an impact on the formation of 
coalitions, elites’ loyalty to the regime or their defection, and international reactions.95 
Certainly, reactions in times of political crisis mostly are shaped by a history of interactions 
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between the incumbent regime and its challengers. They also depend on resources 
accumulated at the national and international level. However, in open-ended conjunctures, 
the regime’s reactions—much like protestors’ performances—oscillate between established 
registers and innovations. The very fact that events occur in different timeframes, that they 
give rise to ‘neighborhood effects,’96 and international (non)reactions to varying degrees, 
contributes to reshuffling the cards and reconfiguring the foundations of the economy of 
concessions and of repression. In other words, forms of crisis management can’t be inferred 
automatically based on the type of regime. 
Incumbents react with threats, sanctions, and repression, but also with offers: 
discursive and symbolic, political change, material goods, lobbying efforts to target specific 
groups, etc. In observing the events, some of them try to draw lessons to refine their 
‘counterrevolutionary’ strategies. They produce narratives and emotional scene setting to 
‘affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries’97; warn of chaos; criminalize 
demonstrators; associate them with foreign powers; organize counterdemonstrations; readjust 
financial, military and diplomatic resources that they manage or fail to mobilize; etc. From 
this perspective, an examination of crisis management in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Syria and in 
Morocco allows us to glimpse several variations (Table 3), in terms of the timing of the 
reaction (early on or late), the degree of adjustment of offers and of sanctions (mistimed, 
disproportionate or relatively appropriate), the degree of disorganization at the level of the 
repressive apparatus, and the images conveyed (indicating the mastery of the situation or a 
loss of control). 
 
Table 3. Crisis Management by Political Regimes 
Reactions of 
the regime 


























Early - Attempts to 
anticipate and to 





Variable, yet to be 
documented 
Partial loss 
of territories  
Syria 
Early  - Adjustment of the 
offer 
- Limited and 
selective repression 
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In Tunisia and in Egypt, the concessions came too late after indiscriminate repression; 
the repressive apparatus seemed somewhat disorganized; and the crisis management gave the 
appearance that the regimes had lost control of the situation. In an analysis, which I do not 
claim to be exhaustive, I highlight some elements. For example, the Tunisian case is an 
excellent example of the leadership reacting too slowly. The regime and its media were silent 
for a long time, and they applied the usual measures to end the protests, without managing to 
hinder the spread of the mobilization.98 Ben Ali so failed to realize the gravity of the situation 
that he did not bother to cut short his private visit to the Emirates. In such a centralized 
system, his absence might have left room for hesitation, and it was only upon his return on 
December 27, 2010, that the machinery truly was set in motion. Even worse, the responses of 
the regime were completely inadequate, given the scale of the protests, and this was only 
accentuated as the crisis continued, which gave credence to ‘the idea of a loss of control over 
the situation, which gave further impetus to the protest dynamic.’99 The police repression on 
January 8 and 9 2011 seems to have been a point of no return. On another level, a lack of 
coordination added to the weakening and disorganization of the security apparatus.100 This 
was exacerbated by the mistrust between the agencies and by individual rivalries, and, among 
other things, this resulted in retention of information or disinformation among different 
agencies. Thus, the strategies of ‘divide and rule’ seemed to have opened the way for some 
unanticipated effects during the crisis. This example demonstrates that, even for those whose 
fate seems, at first glance, to be linked to that of the regime, mutual uncertainty does not 
necessarily result in alignment, but instead may trigger a reinforcement of mutual mistrust.  
While the Tunisian revolution inspired Egyptian revolutionaries, Mubarak and his 
close advisors, in turn, committed at least two errors in assessing the situation.101 First, they 
began by minimizing the crisis. ‘Egypt is not Tunisia’ was both a narrative spread by the 
incumbents in the context of the exchanged moves with the challengers, and a belief shared at 
the very highest levels of state. Secondly, it seemed that they had been convinced that the 
army was going to protect the regime, even though, from 2007 on, there were rumors 
circulating that officers were planning a coup in the event of Gamal Mubarak coming to 
power. As for the repressive apparatus, images displaying the dithering, ambivalence and loss 
of control of the situation, were widely circulated. 
 Unlike Egypt, some political regimes tried, in different ways, to learn from ‘errors’ 
committed by their neighbors. Determined to avoid the same fate as Muammar Qadhafi in 
Libya, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria attempted many strategies simultaneously and 
successively. Firstly, it shifted increasingly toward indiscriminate, large-scale and 
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disproportionate repression. This strategy might be related to two main factors: First, the 
incumbent regime did not have any intermediaries, either to demobilize the challengers or to 
negotiate with some of them; and, second, the repressive apparatus was ‘unfit for purpose,’ 
forcing the regime to abandon some territories from the end of spring 2011.102 Besides the 
escalation of repression, the diffusion of terror among the population, the liberation of 
common prisoners alongside jihadists, and the reinforcement of the military arsenal, the 
regime also followed a strategy of ‘divide and rule’ at the international, regional and 
especially national level.103 Indeed, at the start, the mobilization was peaceful; it brought 
together Sunnis, but also Kurds, Christians and Druzes. Faced with that, the regime launched 
a communication campaign denouncing ‘sectarian sedition,’ and terrorism. While the 
demonstrators chanted: ‘Sunni wa ‘Alawi, wahid, wahid, wahid’ (Sunnis and Alawis, united, 
united, united), the regime positioned itself as the sole guarantor of ‘interfaith tolerance.’104 
Despite the inventiveness displayed by some revolutionaries in bypassing their 
fragmentation, which was amplified by the regime’s repression,105 divisions in the anti-
regime camp grew to the extent that the conflict became internationalized and a matter of 
sectarian division. On the other hand, the heterogeneous coalition around Bashar Al-Assad 
continued to expand to include ‘adversaries to… opponents to the dictator,’106 at the national, 
regional and international level.  
In Morocco as well, the regime seemed to have learned some lessons from its own 
past as well as from its neighbors’ immediate past and present. As soon as mobilizations 
started to spread around the region, the regime multiplied its attempts to buy social peace, 
official and unofficial negotiations, and individual and collective pressure, and reactivated 
networks of local elected representatives. The king very quickly presented a reform plan 
likely to redirect actors—who had ‘strayed’ from the legal opposition—toward 
institutionalized political channels. The regime also enjoyed enhanced support from the 
European Union, which held Morocco up as a ‘reformist’ model for the region. Yet it was in 
terms of repression that the most significant difference could be observed. While blood 
continued to flow in the region, in Morocco, the number of deaths was ten in eight months. 
During the 2011 protests, the regime effectively modulated its repressive options for each 
sequence of the protest, while making adjustments to the inflections it perceived at the 
regional and international levels. However, despite the regime’s efforts, the movement was 
resilient. First, the regime’s concessions gave the movement momentum and were perceived 
as an opportunity to put forward a whole array of sectorial and local claims. After that, the 
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early defections came from actors well enough positioned on the institutionalized political 
scene to hope to benefit from the reforms put in motion, and who had taken to the streets as a 
means to exert pressure in negotiations with the palace. Eight months after the start of the 
movement, the second wave of defections stemmed from a ‘counter-bandwagon effect,’ 
related to the diminished morale of the challengers still in the streets, with an increasing 
awareness of the unpropitious regional circumstances, and a perception that mobilization 
benefited only a certain contingent from the initial challengers who had taken to the streets.107 
It should be emphasized to what degree in Morocco, the uncertainty inherent to open-ended 
conjunctures was rapidly offset by self-restraint, by the authorities, as well as by a protest 
movement dominated by ‘organized’ actors, ‘proud of their ability to control the streets.’108 
Therefore, neither the initiators of the movement nor the repressive apparatus were 
irremediably overtaken by the ‘street.’ Consequently, a point of no return was not reached, 
and the route of gradual change remained the order of the day.  
Conclusion 
During open-ended conjunctures, indeterminacy disturbs the routinized functioning of 
societies, undermines certainties and ritualized and embedded practices, and leads all the 
actors present to veer off the beaten path; in so doing, open-ended conjunctures transform 
structures. In comparing the Tunisian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Moroccan cases, we see that the 
form of the state and of the social conflict contributes to shaping the configuration of 
coalitions confronting each other in open-ended conjunctures. However, these factors are not 
sufficient to hinder the extension of the mobilization, the formation of large coalitions and the 
defection of actors assumed to be allies by those in power. Similarly, and contrary to certain 
retrospective predictions, the structure of the repressive apparatus does not automatically 
determine loyalty or defection; despite its homogeneity and its professionalization, the 
Tunisian army did not defect during the first revolutionary sequence, and the Egyptian army 
did not automatically rally to the side of the revolutionaries. Moreover, the societal identity 
cleavages are not necessarily static, allowing for the ‘prediction’ of whether or not 
mobilization will spread to other categories of society.  
Indeed, in open-ended conjunctures, an array of processes and of performances 
contributes to redefining the conditions of protest activities, especially since events occur in a 
number of locations, at varying times. Also, the regime’s elites are subject to a tension 
between crisis management repertoires established in recent years and the need to improvise. 
Ways of interpreting national and regional events, the nature and timing of reactions, and the 
degree of disorganization manifested seem to have played a fundamental role, including the 
maintenance or loss of external support for regimes. Thus, in Tunisia and in Egypt, the 
                                               
107 Bennani-Chraïbi & Jeghllaly, The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement, p. 129-130. 
108 Ibid, p. 130. 
Middle East Critique, volume 26, no. 4 (Fall 2017) 
 23 
regimes were slow to act, and the proposed reforms and modalities of repression proved ill 
suited to the protest dynamic, and did too little too late. The incumbent leaders seemed to 
have been overtaken by events, then abandoned by some of their usual support bases within 
the state and society, and only timidly backed by their usual external allies. In contrast, the 
Syrian and Moroccan regimes demonstrated foresight and modulated their reactions as a 
function of their observations of what was unfolding in the region and internationally. 
However, major differences emerged. In the Syrian case, an escalation of the repression 
contributed to radicalizing the challengers, and then militarizing a conflict, which endured, 
thanks to the support provided to the various protagonists by competing foreign donors, and 
to effects such as those produced by the Libyan events; the regime of Bashar Al-Assad 
managed to survive (at least a few years) even if it was forced to abandon territories. In the 
Moroccan case, the limited use of repression, and the self-limitation exercised by some of the 
principal actors contributed to reducing the margins of uncertainty; the regime was not 
confronted with an irreversible loss of control of the situation. 
Going forward, much work remains to be done to move further on in an interactionist 
and sequential approach to open-ended conjunctures. While the ambition to apprehend this 
class of events in a more interactive and dynamic way is somewhat common to several 
scholars, the main challenge here is to develop the means to go beyond the declamatory 
stage. In addition, in this article, I have sketched some avenues to be explored in terms of 
degree and extent of the implementation of the recommended framework. Undoubtedly, the 
traces of the effects of contingency and of emotions during contemporary events are easier to 
grasp for the analyst of social mobilizations. Indeed, it is much more difficult to have detailed 
and cross-referenced accounts of interactions, emotions, and trial and error processes, 
sequence by sequence, for state actors, agents of the repressive apparatus, regional and 
international actors, etc. However, these obstacles should not lead to a reinforcement of the 
division of tasks among scholars: focus on structures and continuities from a macro-level 
standpoint for scholars in comparative political regimes; and the analysis of interactions, 
emotions, and the effects of contingency, from a micro and meso-level perspective for 
scholars of social movements. 
Beyond the events of 2011, the approach advocated should encourage the 
establishment of multidisciplinary teams that share the same willingness to open black boxes, 
to conduct multilevel analyses, and to track meticulously and sequence by sequence the 
interactions among different actors present during an open-ended conjuncture. Furthermore, 
to pursue these multilevel analyses, we seriously should consider mixing several methods, 
while remaining attentive to the epistemological stakes of each choice: While regression 
statistics contribute to capturing the conducive elements at one point in time, combining 
ethnography and sequential analysis would be more appropriate for dealing with the 
‘messiness’ of causation during open-ended conjunctures. The remaining methodological 
challenge is to capture the processes at work, the turning points, and the different types of 
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contingency effects, while bringing the actor back in, not as a puppet, but as a historicized 
actor, an actor acted upon, acting and interacting. In other words, what the event does—
immediately, and in the short, medium and long terms—to ordinary citizens, organizations of 
social movements, state and repressive apparatus, regional and international actors, etc., 
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